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Introduction
As forced migration becomes an increasingly prominent global challenge, political
responses to it demand closer scrutiny. This essay considers one of the most widely
used responses to refugee flows, the refugee camp. For the past seventy years camps
have been a primary response to forced migration. In 2016, several hundred camps
and settlements existed worldwide, housing more than twelve million refugees and
internally displaced.1 From the Algerian desert to the Thai forest, these camps vary in
almost every dimension. Some are the size of cities, while others are more like towns.
Some are fenced and guarded, while others allow free movement. Some have existed
for generations, while others are newly created. Amid such diversity, what do these
spaces have in common? What is a refugee camp? This is a deceptively simple
question, and one that has never been satisfactorily answered. Some authors have
divided the universe of camps into categories, distinguishing (for example) self-
settlements, assisted self-settlements, and organized settlements.2 Others have focused
on camps’ institutional governance, and particularly on the role of international
agencies in providing assistance as a (non-transparent, largely unaccountable)
“surrogate state.”3 Many more have sidestepped the problem entirely, recognizing
refugee camps as spaces of contradiction—of “care and control,” “compassion and
repression”—that defy more specific definition.4
This failure to define the refugee camp has had consequences, not least of which
has been to obscure the fact that such spaces are a distinct policy choice. Refugee
camps are not an inevitable response to forced migration—in fact, their use is surpris-
ingly recent, dating largely from post-1945. Yet there has been a marked lack of
curiosity about the circumstances underlying camps’ adoption and use. This essay
seeks to address that oversight, arguing that to understand the refugee camp we must
understand, or at least acknowledge, its antecedents. Undertaking such a historical
analysis is again complicated by the lack of conceptual clarity of “the camp.” Is a
refugee camp sui generis or part of a wider complex of encampment? If the latter,
what are its parameters? A basic definition of camps might include all sites that are
spatially bounded and have a temporary existence: an immense variety of spaces, from
Scout camps to protest camps. An alternative understanding is offered from political
theorists who define “the camp” not as a primarily spatial entity but as a logic of
power. Many scholars have applied Agamben’s analysis of the concentration camp as
“nomos of the modern” to the context of refugee camps, viewing the two sites as
existing in parallel relationships of state violence and exception.5 Others have used a
Foucauldian lens, examining the biopolitical nature of refugee camp administration
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and considering the camp as one component of a wide-ranging disciplinary technology
of modern governance.6 These approaches capture important dimensions of camp
governance, including an abrogation of sovereign functions by the hosting state and
the administration of camps for a category of population. However, as an explanatory
framework they are simultaneously too broad and too narrow: too broad, because
biopolitical modes of governance and a relationship of exception are not specific to
the camp but may exist in a multitude of sites and spaces; too narrow, because in
focusing on power imposed from above they neglect the many ways in which camp
residents negotiate, evade, and resist it.
Ultimately, analyses of the camp as biopolitical or a state of exception pay insuffi-
cient attention to the core function of a refugee camp, and the characteristic that makes
this space fundamentally unlike other spaces of marginalization and exception:
containment. Refugee camps exist to contain forced migrants until such time as they
can return home or an alternative durable solution is possible. Certainly, the extent of
containment varies. At one end of the spectrum lie refugee camps in Thailand or
Kenya where residents are forbidden from leaving the camp boundaries. At the other
extreme are camps where residents are free to work and travel, as in Uganda. Never-
theless, with varying degrees of institutional and legal formality, camps segregate their
residents from a surrounding area. Even where freedom of movement exists, inherent
in the concept of a camp is the imposition of a boundary between the camp space and
the world beyond and thus the containment of residents within those bounds.7
This purpose of containment is fundamental to my argument. It is not a unique
insight; other authors have also described segregation and “quarantine” as a defining
function of the refugee camp.8 However, in this essay, I wish to go beyond simple
recognition to explore its implications and consequences. This requires not merely
acknowledging containment as the defining function of a refugee camp but recog-
nizing containment as a particular type of encampment.
There are some caveats. First, not all containment occurs in camps. In refugee
policy, the term “containment” has been used to describe a shift from asylum predi-
cated on protecting mobility to asylum predicated on managing mobility, with the
latter goal primarily achieved by containment in migrants’ region or even country of
origin.9 Physical confinement in camps is one mechanism for this, but containment
may also be a consequence of other restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement
(including, but by no means limited to, border security, visa controls, and immi-
gration detention), or of a failure to facilitate lasting durable solutions that enable
refugees and IDPs to escape their conditions.
Beyond the context of refugee situations, containment occurs in spaces of incarcer-
ation. Refugee camps are often compared to prisons, in an analogy of “total
institutions.”10 There are certainly parallels between the two, but there are also
important differences. Refugee camps are created and managed for categories of popu-
lation; they are biopolitical. In contrast, prisons exemplify disciplinary power; they
detain individuals on the basis of their individual actions. Furthermore, refugee camps
have a temporary, politically conditional existence. If political circumstances change
or an alternative durable solution is found, the camp no longer has a reason to exist.
It must be stressed that “temporary” does not mean short-lived: experience has shown
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that once refugee camps are created they tend to stay in existence for many years, even
decades. Nevertheless, even in the most long-standing encampment situations, such
as for Palestinian refugees, camps were not desired or designed as permanent homes
but were built as a temporary refuge until political circumstances changed. Prisons, in
contrast, have a continuing existence, independent of the circumstances of one set of
inmates.
Recognizing these features of a refugee camp makes the link with incarceration
less compelling and the link with segregation more central. However, just as not all
containment occurs in camps, not all camps are spaces of containment. Feigenbaum,
Frenzel, and McCurdy note that the term “camp” derives from the Latin campus and
since Roman times has had both leisure and military connotations.11 Leisure and
military camps operate fundamentally to facilitate mobility. Camps created to
constrain mobility are a more recent invention. A definition of the refugee camp must
capture this dimension of containment, in addition to aspects of spatiality, political
contingence, and biopolitical governance. As a definition of “camps of containment,”
then, I propose the following:
A site that is spatially bounded (i.e., it is an identifiable site); temporally limited
(i.e., it exists pending an end to conflict or an alternative durable solution); is
biopolitical (i.e., is designed and administered for a category of population rather
than for individuals); and segregates residents from a surrounding population by
formal or informal restrictions.
Each of these criteria is equally important. The spatial criterion distinguishes a camp
of containment from more diffuse patterns of segregation (perhaps as in an urban
“ghetto”). The temporal requirement distinguishes a camp of containment from a
lasting political project to manage minority populations (a category that might include
Indian reservations in the United States). The biopolitical dimension distinguishes
camps containing a category of population from sites of detention based on individual
sentencing. Finally, the dimension of segregation establishes the relationship of
otherness and othering that is intrinsic to a camp of containment, Cumulatively, these
criteria define a form of political governance that is surprisingly rare. Indeed, I have
identified only three core categories of “camps of containment”: prisoner-of-war
camps, internment camps, and camps for forced migrants. A simple comparison of
these categories would be misguided. Collectively, they represent thousands of camps
created over more than two hundred years, affecting millions of lives. Furthermore, as
I have argued elsewhere, every camp is a complex governance environment in its own
right, the product of pluralistic legal and political interactions and of extensive
historical and cultural influences.12
A broad historical comparison cannot hope to capture the complexity of each
individual camp—but it has a different analytical value, potentially highlighting reso-
nances between camps across the centuries and thus affording new insight into camps
as a unique disciplining mechanism. In particular, a long-term perspective on the
history of the camp highlights continuities in the model, showing “camps of
containment” to be an evolving politico-military strategy of quarantine that is related
both to changing patterns of political conflict and to shifting public anxieties about
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national security and where it is perceived to be under threat. Recognizing the
centrality of containment emphasizes the political purpose behind the creation of these
camps and in doing so provides an explanation that augments analyses of the camp as
paradigmatic of exception or biopolitics. These findings are discussed in more detail
below, following a brief overview of camps of containment.
Camps of Containment
Recognizing camps as a product of modernity, Bauman has characterized the twen-
tieth century as “the century of camps.”13 I would argue that the development of
camps is rooted in a less-modern modernity than Bauman suggests: beginning not
with the long twentieth century but rather the late eighteenth century. The few
existing genealogies of encampment begin with concentration camps and the role of
colonialism in the generation and reproduction of a technology of extermination.14
This overlooks a crucial earlier phase in the history of encampment, that of prisoner-
of-war camps.
Prisoner-of-War Camps (1790s–Present)
As with refugee camps, prisoner-of-war camps are a relatively recent innovation.
Throughout much of the history of war, enemy prisoners were killed, enslaved, or
held for a short period before being ransomed, released in a prisoner exchange, or
paroled (i.e., a pledge not to re-enter hostilities). It was not until the French Revolu-
tionary Wars (1792–1802) that for the first time large numbers of enemy prisoners
were detained until the end of hostilities. The first known prisoner-of-war camp was
created in 1796 in England. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), there were nine
purpose-built POW prison camps across Britain. Prisoners were also detained in
decommissioned naval vessels (“hulks”) moored in ports. In total, more than 100,000
French POWs were detained in Britain over the course of the wars.15 Detention condi-
tions varied by prisoners’ military rank. Low-ranking soldiers were imprisoned in the
hulks and camps, where food was insufficient and disease flourished. Officers were
granted a modified form of parole. Unlike conventional parole, they were not
permitted to return to France but were kept within Britain. However, they were not
held in the hulks or camps but were allowed to live in the community with restrictions
on their movement, such as an evening curfew and a commitment to remain within
one mile of their residence.16
In another parallel with the refugee camp the history of POW camps has received
relatively little academic attention, though the widespread use of encampment repre-
sented a crucial transformation in responses to military prisoners. It is important to
recognize that containment of prisoners occurred because previous systems for dealing
with enemy prisoners became less viable. During the Napoleonic Wars, substantially
more French soldiers than British soldiers were taken prisoner. This reduced the
French incentive to participate in prisoner exchange by, in effect, devaluing the
exchange rate. Parole became less appealing to Britain when it became apparent that
French officers frequently violated their parole promise and reentered the conflict.
Ultimately, the transformation in the treatment of prisoners of war must be under-
stood in the context of sovereign and military reform throughout Europe, including
the move from mercenary armies toward a professional military and the displacement
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of aristocratic privilege from the center of military culture. These wider transitions
were realized to a new extent during the Napoleonic Wars, in light of “the French
revolutionary attack on established cultural practices, and [the emergence of] new
French conceptions of citizenship, soldiers and war.”17 In this context of new under-
standings of patriotism and of the nation, captured prisoners could no longer be
depended on to act in accordance with either mercenary motivations or aristocratic
values: they were loyal to their national army rather than to a generic soldier’s code.
Prisoner-of-war camps thus served a strategic purpose in preventing the return of
combatants to conflict—but camps were necessary only because the character of war
had fundamentally changed.
POW camps were institutionalized over subsequent conflicts, including the
American Civil War (1861–65), which similarly began under a prisoner-exchange
system and ended with the existence of a dense network of close to 150 camps. More
than 410,000 men were held in camps over the course of the war, in conditions that
are still notorious today. More than 50,000 people died in the Civil War prison camps,
largely due to unsanitary and overcrowded conditions, which were worsened by delib-
erate abuse of prisoners.18 Prisoners and their families perceived the very existence of
POW camps as a tactic of war intended to exacerbate suffering in an already brutal
conflict. Yet at the same time that thousands of men were dying of starvation and
disease in POW camps, a nascent effort to regulate conflict was underway, through
the Lieber Code of 1863. The Lieber Code focused on practices for prisoner exchange
and parole rather than the use and management of camps and there is little to suggest
that it affected the use of POW camps during the Civil War. After the war ended,
however, its provisions on the humane treatment of prisoners of war formed the basis
of a criminal prosecution of a former commander of Andersonville prison camp,
Captain Henry Wirz, who was convicted of war crimes and hanged.19
Prisoner-of-war camps became a routine feature of international conflict, reaching
their peak use during World Wars I and II when captured combatants were held in
camps in Russia, Germany, Japan, and throughout the UK, United States, and
Canada. By one estimate, in 1944 nine million POWs were held in camps in Germany
alone.20 Again, illness and epidemics were common, as was the abuse and exploitation
of prisoners. In Asia, Russia, and Europe, hundreds of thousands of men died under-
going forced labor and death marches. In France, German prisoners were used to
conduct mine clearance, causing the death or injury of two thousand men each
month.21 It is a tribute to human resilience that even in the most repressive conditions
of encampment and incarceration, prisoners resisted. Resistance was expressed in
numerous ways: refusal to follow orders, protest, and the quintessential prisoners’
resistance—escape. From British officers in Colditz to interned Irish Republicans in
Belfast, escape was a constant desire, even elevated to the status of a responsibility.22
As Bashford and Strange emphasize, “This history of protest against detention is as
important to recognise as the techniques of detention themselves.”23
It is notable that as the material architecture of encampment expanded, so did a
legal architecture for the protection of those held in camps. From the Lieber Code
onward, numerous international treaties mandated the humane treatment of prisoners
of war, including the Brussels Declaration of 1874, the Hague Declarations of 1899
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and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 and their Additional Protocols
of 1977. These treaties had a number of important consequences: they situated respon-
sibility for prisoners of war with the national military; established containment as the
appropriate humane treatment of POWs (as opposed to exchange or parole); defined
a baseline of humanitarian protection; and, finally, created a system of status determi-
nation to decide who was entitled to that protection.
Internment Camps (1890s–Present)
A second category of “camps as containment” is internment camps. Indeed, the
two might even be considered co-extensive, as the essence of internment is the
containment of a category of people on the basis of their identity rather than their
individual actions. Internment has most commonly been justified on grounds of
medical quarantine or national security, but the spectrum of internment past and
present includes labor camps, political re-education camps, and the most notorious
camps of all, concentration camps.24
The discussion below focuses on internment of civilian populations in war, as
perhaps the purest example of a camp established solely for containment. Concen-
tration camps are now inescapably associated with extermination, but the first
concentration camps were essentially internment camps. In the 1890s, Spanish colo-
nists under siege in Cuba sought to reduce support to the resistance through a
reconcentracio´n policy that contained more than 500,000 civilians in camps.25 Killing
civilians was not a stated goal but little was done to avert it, and conservative estimates
suggest at least 100,000 people in these camps died from starvation and disease.26
Despite the terrible human cost of encampment in Cuba, the model of civilian
concentration in camps was rapidly adopted by other colonial powers including the
United States in the Philippines (1899–1902), the British in South Africa (1899–1902),
Germany in Deutsche Sud-West Afrika (1904–7), and Italy in Libya (1928–32).
Comparing concentration camps and refugee camps has been described by some
authors as polemical and disrespectful to victims of the Holocaust and defended by
others as a means of honoring their suffering.27 Arguably, a distinction can be made
between earlier iterations of the concentration camp model (where a counterinsur-
gency objective was present) and their later use (where genocidal intent was
paramount).28 To some, this distinction may seem semantic. The vast majority of
deaths in the early concentration camps were due to disease rather than deliberate
killing: but given the crowded conditions of encampment, epidemic spread was a
likely outcome and must have been understood as such by administrators. Whether
disease was an intentional tool of population control or whether administrators were
simply indifferent to “native” deaths, racism was from the outset deeply rooted in the
concentration camp model.29 Nevertheless, the first concentration camps were essen-
tially a military tactic. Just as prisoner-of-war camps responded to the changing
character and composition of military forces, internment camps responded to a new
form of conflict. Colonial authorities were under attack from irregular guerrilla groups
that gained strength and support from the local civilian population and were not
always distinguishable from those populations. The goal was to reduce this avenue of
support, and containment in camps provided a means to do so.
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A further advantage of camps was the political ambiguity that they afforded,
allowing colonial administrators to control civilian populations in a manner that could
be represented back home as protecting civilians from war. This dynamic is well illus-
trated in the context of British camps created in South Africa during the Boer War
(1899–1902). More than a hundred camps were created (forty-five to contain civilian
families of Boer commandoes and around sixty for native Africans),30 as part of a
network of encampment that also included POW camps in South Africa, St. Helena,
Ceylon, India, Bermuda, and Portugal.31 Krebs notes that the Boer War gave rise to
“a frenzy of jingoism” and an equally frenzied anti-imperialist opposition. The
concentration camps became central to this political contestation. In Britain, they
were portrayed as munificent welfare from the British army to the families of their
opponents. Politicians called them “refugee camps” and described the residents as
civilians who had entered the camps voluntarily for protection. Those who visited the
camps told a different story, of farm clearances and the forced encampment of women
and children in conditions where as many as one-third to one-half of those confined
died.32 One of those visitors was a British peace activist, Emily Hobhouse, who
published a report describing camp residents as prisoners and the camps as plagued
by sickness, overcrowding, insufficient food, fuel, clothes and blankets, and absent
sanitation or other services.33 This report catalyzed a bitter political battle that was
expressed largely in terms of gender and vulnerability but was in essence a question of
status: were the women in these camps political prisoners or refugees? Krebs writes:
Why didn’t the War Office from the first admit that the camps were established
to keep the Boer women from passing intelligence along to the commandos? In
admitting that, they would have been admitting that the women were imprisoned
because of their military activities, were in fact, as the Liberals and the Irish MPs
were saying, prisoners of war.34
Or, in Hobhouse’s words:
It is such a curious position, hollow and rotten to the heart’s core, to have made
all over the State large, uncomfortable communities of people whom you call
refugees, and say you are protecting, but who call themselves prisoners of war,
compulsorily detained, and detesting your protection.35
It is notable that the intensity of feeling for encamped Boer families was not matched
with concern for encamped Africans, whose experiences were ignored at the time and
continue to be overlooked today.36 It was not only in England that concentration
camps were controversial and their political rationalization was hypocritical. The
United States government criticized the Spanish reconcentracio´n policy, even using it
as grounds for the intervention and military occupation of Cuba—but swiftly imple-
mented “concentration zones” in the Philippines when an earlier hearts-and-minds
campaign failed to subdue insurgency. The German government criticized British
cruelty in South Africa—but shortly thereafter created its own network of camps in
Deutsche Sud-West Afrika (now Namibia). The camps in Namibia marked a
destructive shift in the evolution of the model, taking what Everdell describes as the
camp’s “built-in auxiliary capacity for extermination” and making it the primary
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purpose.37 The use of camps for the Herero and Nama contributed to the decimation
of these peoples in what is now recognized as the twenty-first century’s first genocide.
Subsequent camps consolidated the link between concentration camps and forced
labor, and between concentration camps and killing, including those in Russia,
throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, and more recently in the former Yugoslavia. In
this evolution of the camp as a genocidal weapon, it is a curious historical coincidence
that the first commissioner of the German camps in Namibia was Heinrich Goering,
father of Hermann Goering, founder of the first concentration camps in Germany.38
Concentration camps were created by occupying powers in order to contain
civilians. A second route in the development of internment camps was the
containment by governments of “enemy aliens” who were present in their territory.
Internment camps were a prominent feature of World War I, when more than 500,000
civilians were interned. The day after declaring war on Germany, Britain passed a law
“transforming every foreigner born in Germany or Austria-Hungary into an ‘enemy
alien’ ” and imposing stringent restrictions on their travel, communications, and
trade.39 After German submarines sank the Lusitania ocean liner—causing more than
1,000 civilian deaths—these “enemy aliens” were ordered into internment camps. As
the war continued, internment camps spread around the world. Alongside the devel-
opment of these camps, Pitzer notes, was an emerging “administrative bureaucracy”
that linked internment camps to international agencies and allowed internees to train
and study for recognized qualifications, even Oxbridge degrees. As a result, “by 1918,
the imprisonment of civilians seemed unexceptionable. The most humane parts of the
camps—the Red Cross packages, the libraries, the orchestral performances—had
normalized the idea of wartime internment.”40
In this emerging architecture of protection and normalization of containment, the
evolution of internment camps shows notable parallels with the prisoner-of-war camp.
Other striking parallels between the models include material architecture (a topic
beyond the scope of this essay but one emerging as a distinct field of study) and the
rapid international adoption of the model despite its capacity for abuse or destruction.
Similar, though less extreme, tendencies can also be seen in the evolution of the
refugee camp.
Camps as a Response to Forced Migration (1915–Present)
It is difficult to say when the first refugee camps were created, or to identify what
we should consider to be the first refugee camp. Among the first camps to be called
“refugee camps” were the British concentration camps of the Boer War. Closer to
current understandings of the model are camps created for Armenians fleeing genocide
in 1915–18, or even the “dust bowl” camps established for labor migrants in
Depression-era California. There may well be other, earlier examples. However, the
consistent, large-scale use of refugee camps as a response to forced migration is
undoubtedly a recent phenomenon, beginning during World War II. Displaced
Persons (DP) camps were created across Europe, initially to house people fleeing the
Nazi regime but subsequently also to accommodate people who had been freed from
concentration camps or who were fleeing the Soviet Army. The policy shift is no less
remarkable with more than a half-century’s hindsight: at the very height of camps as
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spaces of cruelty, they were adopted as spaces of compassionate humanitarianism.41 As
Arendt recognized at the time, “The world has created a new kind of human
beings—the kind that are put in concentration camps by their foes and in internment
camps by their friends.”42 This is an extraordinary political moment, which precisely
illustrates the fluidity of camps of containment and captures their paradoxical dimen-
sions of care and control.
Subsequent decades saw a rapid proliferation of camps, beginning with refugees
from Indian Partition, then from the creation of the State of Israel, and culminating
in the position today, where approximately one-third of the global population of
refugees and asylum seekers is housed in hundreds of camps across the global south
and unknown numbers are interned in immigration detention centers in the global
north.43
One important distinction between refugee camps and the other camps of
containment analyzed here is longevity: once created, refugee camps tend to remain
in existence for a very long time. The last Displaced Persons camp in Europe closed
in 1959, nearly fifteen years after the end of the Second World War. Many other camps
created in the immediate postwar years remain in existence today, including in West
Bengal and in the West Bank. Camps entered an era of particular expansion during
the “Second Cold War” of 1977–85, when new regional conflicts led to the creation of
camps in Southeast Asia, Central America, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa.44
As the Cold War continued, geopolitical containment agendas also led to the
containment of migration. International resettlement places contracted and refugee
camps became the “de facto fourth durable solution”: a long-term home for displaced
people.45 In that time, the creation and management of refugee camps has become a
humanitarian industry, involving hundreds of international organizations in food,
shelter, sanitation, education, health, and other forms of assistance.
Among the many refugee and IDP camps in existence, some are more clearly
spaces of “containment” than others. Even tightly controlled refugee settlements will
have some interaction with a surrounding population, whether through entrepreneurs
traveling into the camp to sell goods and services or refugees traveling “outside” for
work or education. Likewise, all camps will develop an internal infrastructure of
schools, clinics, shops, faith centers, and other institutions of daily life. In these and
myriad other ways, camps will be sites of agency, adaptation, and political organi-
zation. These aspects challenge prevailing understandings of refugee camps as wholly
anarchic spaces. Yet even the least-worst camp environments produce estrangement
and alienation.46 The nature of a camp is to separate populations, and interchange
between camp residents and a local population does not in itself constitute a rela-
tionship of equals. The extent of exclusion varies, but some degree of segregation is
inevitable.
It might be argued that the turn to encampment was an unavoidable response to
unprecedented migration flows and pressures: that camps are simply a convenient,
necessary (and therefore morally neutral) response to mass movement of peoples. This
argument is undermined by the history of political responses to asylum, which indi-
cates a direct preference for containment over its alternatives. In the interwar years,
the leading refugee protection mechanism was the Nansen Passport, a document that
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enabled forced migrants to legally cross international borders. This initiative foun-
dered on a shortage of state cooperation and subsequent decades saw increasing
retrenchment in attitudes toward forced migrants. After World War II, Proudfoot
wrote, “The one form of international action which would have provided the most
substantial relief for the refugees would have been a widespread lowering of immi-
gration barriers. Most nations, however, were prepared to do no more than suggest
this course of action for their neighbors.”47 This has become a recurring theme in the
field of refugee protection.
This brief history of the refugee camp illustrates again the rapid adoption of the
camp model in its application to a new category of people. It also illustrates the
contrast between often inhumane conditions and a lexicon of humanitarian assistance
that (while undoubtedly ethically intended) ultimately served to normalize
containment as a mechanism of protection. As explained above, both POW camps
and internment camps tended to be politically rationalized as a humanitarian response,
even as the reality of containment was often brutal. Refugee camps may seem to have
a more authentically humanitarian role, but as encampment situations increased in
number and duration, problems also gathered pace. Campaigns against refugee “ware-
housing” highlighted human rights concerns (such as that maintaining refugees in
camps violated rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence); the difficult
conditions that tend to prevail in camp settings (poverty, overcrowding, lack of oppor-
tunities, exploitation in informal economy); and, perhaps most damaging of all, abuses
of authority by staff of international humanitarian agencies.48 Policy reforms even-
tually followed. In 1997, the UNHCR produced a policy for refugees in urban areas
that appeared to be predicated on an assumption that refugees “belonged” in camps
and should go to camps in order to receive aid and assistance.49 Twelve years later, an
updated urban refugee policy placed respect for freedom of movement and choice of
residence at the center of its approach.50 Finally, in 2014, a policy on alternatives to
camps stated that UNHCR will seek to “avoid the establishment of refugee camps”
wherever possible.51
However, these policy reforms must be balanced against the continuing political
reality of millions of people living in hundreds of camps worldwide. Recent years have
seen the creation of many new camps in Turkey and Jordan to house refugees from
Syria. There has also been a massive expansion in the use of immigration detention.
Since 2001, Migreurop has traced the use of closed detention spaces for migrants in
Europe and the Mediterranean. Its most recent “Encampment Map” identifies 421
such centers.52 Described by Migreurop as “camps,” these sites blur the line between
incarceration and encampment. They are spatially bounded, biopolitical spaces of
containment and segregation, but they are not temporary. These are detention centers
with a continuing existence, not linked to political reform or an opening of durable
solutions.
This points to an important evolution in the nature of forced migration and the
perceived threat represented by forced migrants. During the Cold War, the threat was
one of political ideology and potential militarization. Over subsequent decades, the
perceived threat presented by refugees has been to demographic balance, to public
health, to natural resources and the environment. More recently, the threat appears to
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have morphed into something more generalized. Mark Duffield has described a state
of global civil war against refugees in terms of “under-developed species-life” and the
“global non-insured.”53 His analysis recognizes that the dominant form of political
conflict is no longer ideologically led and conducted between or within nation-states
but is a global struggle between developed and underdeveloped humanity. This is a
war without obvious end, and containment is a crucial strategy in its conduct.
Conclusion
Several analyses of refugee camps have recognized a common heritage with concen-
tration camps. None, to my knowledge, has recognized the parallels with prisoner-of-
war camps. By doing so, this essay offers a new and illuminating perspective on the
history of the refugee camp. Most obviously, it changes the timeframe for analysis,
shifting the frame from camps as a product of the twentieth century to camps as a
product of modernity (and thus, it might be argued, intrinsically related to the
changing nature and role of the contemporary state). The longue dure´e of the camp
also reveals its history of transformation and reinvention. Each evolution of the camp
as containment has represented a transformation in the political response to a
particular category of people, moving from a palette of responses (or a nonresponse)
to a presumptive use of containment. Furthermore, the camp itself has been repeatedly
reinvented for different categories of people—combatants, civilians, “enemy aliens,”
refugees—while retaining a fundamental continuity in central features and purpose.
This analysis shows the camp to be considerably more adaptive than comparisons
focused solely on extermination camps might suggest.
The salience of a category of camps of containment is reinforced by blurred
boundaries between the different models. In 1803, Napoleon interned all British male
civilians of military age and called them “prisoners of war.” In the Anglo–Boer War,
British politicians frequently referred to the concentration camps as “refugee camps.”
In World War II, the British government described its internment camp on the Isle
of Man as a “prisoner-of-war camp” though it contained civilians as well as enemy
prisoners. The camp models seem almost interchangeable. More surprisingly, so do
the resident populations. In World War II, people released from concentration camps
were promptly confined in displaced person camps where, as the war drew to a close,
they were joined by increasing numbers of Nazi prisoners of war. This was not unique
to Europe. Refugees who were resettled to Australia during the war were interned as
“enemy aliens,” in the same camps and under the same conditions as Nazi and Fascist
prisoners of war.54 The apparent absurdity of this becomes explicable only when we
understand the camp in relation to its purpose of containment, when we recognize
that the POW camp, internment camp, and refugee camps are not separate species
but are essentially similar.
The history of camps of containment shows them to be spaces of contradiction in
numerous respects. They are sites that can perform humanitarian functions of
protection, security, and service delivery while simultaneously serving political goals
of containment and control. They are sites for the generation of human rights
protection and for the abrogation or evasion of those protections. They are sites char-
acterized by restricted autonomy and by resilient agency. They are sites that render
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unwanted populations invisible but which nevertheless consistently generate public
outcry and opposition. Perhaps the most profound contradiction is that a model that
exemplifies stasis has proven so dynamically adaptable.
This provides important context to the camp, reinforcing its function as a mech-
anism for dealing with those who are considered the other. Malkki has described
refugees as “matter out of place,” a term that can equally be applied to prisoners of
war or enemy aliens.55 In effect, encampment is a strategy used against misfits, and it
is acceptable to a wider public for that very reason. As Fassin writes, “A situation that
should be considered intolerable is in fact tolerated because the public order is
threatened by immigrants, enemies, communists, gypsies, Jews, and collaborators.”56
The essential function of these camps is to contain a population category apart from
the wider population. This has a dual function, regulating the behavior and movement
of those inside the camp boundaries but arguably performing an even more critical
role in regulating relationships with those outside. As Bauman recognizes,
estrangement and segregation are not byproducts of containment but its primary
function. Cause and effect are inseparable here. The segregation of categories of people
has been used repeatedly throughout history to define and discipline those who are
different or unwanted, and their (real or perceived) difference is further heightened
by segregation.57 Camps of containment, then, can be understood as both a product
and a cause of alienation and estrangement.
A recurring theme in this genealogy of the camp has been a tension between
inhumane conditions and humanitarian rationales. When people are put in camps,
negative consequences abound, from the epidemic spread of disease, to food shortages,
to labor exploitation and the direct abuse of power. Yet their use has consistently been
challenged, with calls to abolish the British camps in South Africa echoed in our own
time by the campaign to end refugee “warehousing.”58 Furthermore, contrary to the
perception that camps exist in a state of extralegal exception, they have consistently
been sites for the generation and application of new legal regimes. Texts from the
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929) to the SPHERE
Handbook (2011) have set standards for the humane treatment of those who are held
in camps—and in doing so, they have repeatedly joined a humanitarian discourse of
protection with acceptance of containment as a mechanism of protection.
However, while camps of containment exist within a struggle for the ethical
management of war, they are at heart a mechanism of war rather than a constraint on
it. Recognizing prisoner-of-war camps as antecedents of the refugee camp clarifies the
extent to which the evolution of camps of containment is linked to the changing
character of conflict, or, differently phrased, to changing perceptions of threats to
security. For example, detention of prisoners of war began when exchange, parole,
and conscription systems became less valuable. Internment of civilians during war
began when guerrilla warfare blurred the principle of distinction between combatants
and civilians. Camps for forced migrants were used when wars began to generate
massive migration outflows. The different iterations of camps of containment thus
reflect evolving practices of international conflict. They also indicate a changing
anxiety about national security and where it is perceived to be under threat: from
prisoners being released back into the conflict; from civilians providing intelligence
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and support to insurgents; or, in our own time, from forced migrants as the “global
noninsured.” The continued use of refugee camps, IDP camps, and immigration
detention camps suggests that forced migrants will continue to be targets of
containment for some time to come.59
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